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CHAPTER

Overview of the Issues
‘‘You,’’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense
of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast
assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. Who you are is nothing but
a pack of neurons . . . although we appear to have free will, in fact, our choices
have already been predetermined for us and we cannot change that.
— Francis Cricky

Neuroscience has the potential to make internal contributions to legal doctrine and
practice if the relation is properly understood. For now, however, such
contributions are modest at best and neuroscience poses no genuine, radical
challenges to concepts of personhood, responsibility, and competence.
— Stephen Morseyy

CHAPTER S UMMARY
This chapter:
 Introduces fundamental themes to be explored in the book, and illustrates
the potentially wide-ranging applications of neuroscience to law.
 Foreshadows some of the important limits to using neuroscience in legal
contexts.
 Raises practical and ethical questions about the implications of neuroscience
research for the courtroom, legal practice, and public policy.

INTRODUCTION
Scientists have learned a tremendous amount about how the human brain works,
how it malfunctions, and how it can be repaired and altered. This growing neuroscience knowledge base has already revolutionized medical practice. But when,
why, and how can neuroscience aid law?
This is the central question you will encounter in this coursebook, and we
will encourage you to consider a wide number of potential legal applications.
We will also encourage you to maintain a critical eye. Careful scientific analysis
and careful legal analysis are requisites to successfully navigating the field of
neurolaw.
y Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis 3 (1994).
yy Stephen Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in Neuroscience: Current Legal
Issues 562 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
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This introductory chapter presents a wide variety of possible neuroscience and
law intersections. While criminal defenses of the ‘‘my brain made me do it’’ variety
have drawn much attention, you should see from the material in this chapter that
neuroscience is not limited to the criminal law domain. Indeed, lawyers on the civil
side first coined the term neurolaw in 1995, and in personal injury litigation neurologists and lawyers have a long-standing relationship.1
In addition to recognizing the variety of potential uses, you should also see that
current and future uses of neuroscience in law are not unlimited. Although
evidence suggests that the number of cases involving neuroscientific evidence is
rapidly rising, modern brain science is still new to the legal scene. This is perhaps
obvious, but it is a point worth emphasizing because the youth of the field has
implications for how you read the materials in this book. Unlike some courses,
where the law is relatively fixed and has been for some time, neurolaw is comparatively new and changing. Consider that 86 percent of the publications and cases
included in this book were published only since 2000, and that nearly 60 percent of
these materials were published between 2008-2013.
As with other new technologies that law has confronted, the rise of modern
neuroscience raises deep, recurring questions that you will ask yourself as you read
this book: Is the neuroscience ready? Do we know enough to draw legally relevant
conclusions? Does neuroscience tell us anything we don’t already know from
common sense or previous behavioral research? Are there some areas of law to
which neuroscience may never be relevant? How shall we assess when law should
and should not defer to neuroscientific conclusions? Are the legal actors — judges,
lawyers, and legislators — ready and able to integrate sound neuroscience evidence
into their practice and deliberations? How can legal actors distinguish between
neuroscientific wheat and chaff? Are the scientific researchers and medical professionals capable of communicating their ideas in ways accessible for a legal
audience?
How these questions will be answered is of course unknown today. But what
is known is that the future of neurolaw will likely be determined as much by
legal decision-makers like yourself as it will be by scientists. Legislators, judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars will decide first how to frame these policy questions
and then how to answer them, based on the best information that science can
provide.
This introductory chapter proceeds in five sections. In Section A you will read
two cases, one in criminal law and one in contracts, in which attorneys offered
neuroscience evidence. As you read these cases, consider the arguments of proponents and critics of using neuroscience in these ways — as those arguments will
reoccur throughout the book. Section B discusses the rise of neurolaw as an
area of legal practice, scientific research, and interdisciplinary dialogue. Having
established some of the types of cases and research that have already begun to
emerge, Section C then presents views on the possible future directions neurolaw
may take. As you read Sections B and C, you should think critically and creatively
1. The earliest published uses of the term ‘‘neurolawyer’’ and ‘‘neurolaw’’ were in 1991 and 1995
by Attorney J. Sherrod Taylor. Sherrod J. Taylor, et. al, Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers, 5
Neuropsychology 293 (1991); Sherrod J. Taylor, Neurolaw: Towards a New Medical Jurisprudence, 9
Brain Injury 745 (1995).
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about what areas of law and policy will be most, and least, affected by advances in
neuroscience.

A. INTRODUCING NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Virginia Hughes

Science in Court: Head Case
464 Nature 340 (2010)

Brian Dugan, dressed in an orange jumpsuit and shackles, shuffled to the door of
Northwestern Memorial Hospital in downtown Chicago, accompanied by four
sheriff deputies. It was the first time that Dugan, 52, had been anywhere near a
city in 20 years. Serving two life sentences for a pair of murders he committed in
the 1980s, he was now facing the prospect of the death penalty for an earlier
killing.
Dugan was here on a Saturday this past September to meet one of the few
people who might help him to avoid that fate: Kent Kiehl, a neuroscientist at
the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque. Dugan, Kiehl, and the rest of
the entourage walked the length of the hospital, crossed a walkway to another
building, and took the lift down to a basement-level facility where researchers
would scan Dugan’s brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI).* Todd Parrish, the imaging center’s director, offered plastic zip ties to
replace the shackles — no metal is allowed in the same room as the scanner’s
powerful magnet — but the guards said they weren’t necessary. Dugan entered
the machine without restraints, and Parrish locked the door — as much to keep
the guards and their weapons out as to keep Dugan in.
Dugan lay still inside the scanner for about 90 minutes, performing a series of
cognitive control, attention, and moral decision-making tests. Afterwards, he ate a
hamburger, sat through an extensive psychiatric interview, and rode back to
DuPage county jail, about 50 kilometers west of Chicago.
Kiehl has been amassing data on men such as Dugan for 16 years. Their crimes
are often impulsive, violent, committed in cold blood, and recalled without the
slightest twinge of remorse. They are psychopaths, and they are estimated to make
up as much as 1% of the adult male population and 25% of male prisoners. To
date, Kiehl has used fMRI to scan more than 1,000 inmates, many from a mobile
scanner set up in the courtyard of a New Mexico prison. He says that the brains of
psychopaths tend to show distinct defects in the paralimbic system, a network of
brain regions important for memory and regulating emotion.
Mitigating Circumstances
The purpose of the work, Kiehl says, is to eliminate the stigma against psychopaths and find them treatments so they can stop committing crimes. But Dugan’s

* [Chapters 8 and 9 describe the fMRI method, and the Appendix carefully explains how to
critically evaluate publications using this method. — EDS.]
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lawyers saw another purpose. During sentencing for capital crimes, the defense
may present just about anything as a mitigating factor, from accounts of the
defendant being abused as a child to evidence of extreme emotional disturbance.
Kiehl’s research could offer a persuasive argument that Dugan is a psychopath and
could not control his killer impulses. After reading about Kiehl’s work in the
New Yorker, Dugan’s lawyers asked Kiehl to testify and offered him the chance to
scan the brain of a notorious criminal. Kiehl agreed. . . . Kiehl’s decision has put
him at odds with many in his profession and stirred debate among neuroscientists
and lawyers.
‘‘It is a dangerous distortion of science that sets dangerous precedents for
the field,’’ says Helen Mayberg, a neurologist at Emory University School of
Medicine in Atlanta, Georgia. Mayberg, who uses brain imaging to study depression, has testified against the use of several kinds of brain scans in dozens of
cases since 1992. Although other brain-imaging techniques have been used in
court, it is especially hard to argue that fMRI should be, argue critics. The technique reveals changes in blood flow within the brain, thought to correlate with
brain activity, and it has become popular in research. But most fMRI studies are
small, unreplicated, and compare differences in the average brain activity of
groups, rather than individuals, making it difficult to interpret for single
cases. It is rarely used in diagnosis. Moreover, a recent scan, say some critics,
wouldn’t necessarily indicate Dugan’s mental state when he committed his
crimes.
In 1983, Dugan kidnapped 10-year-old Jeanine Nicarico, of Naperville, Illinois.
He raped her in the back seat of his car and beat her to death. In 1984, he saw a 27year-old nurse waiting at a stop light on a deserted road. He rammed into her car,
raped her, and drowned her in a quarry. A year later, he plucked a 7-year-old girl
from her bicycle, raped her, killed her, and left her body in a drainage ditch,
weighed down with rocks.
Plea Bargaining
. . . Brain imaging has a long history in legal cases. Lawyers have often used
scans as a way to tip the scale in the perpetual battle between opposing expert
psychiatric witnesses. You can’t control your brain waves, the theory goes, and
scans are an objective measure of mental state. ‘‘The psychiatric diagnosis is still
soft data — it’s behavior,’’ notes Ruben Gur, director of the Brain Behavior Center
at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. ‘‘The brain scan doesn’t lie. If
there is tissue missing from your brain, there is no way you could have
manufactured it for the purpose of the trial.’’
Brain imaging played into the 1982 trial of John Hinckley Jr., who had
attempted to assassinate U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Lawyers presented a computed tomography X-ray scan of his head, arguing that it showed slight brain
shrinkage and abnormally large ventricles*, indicating a mental defect. The

* [Ventricles are cavities in the brain filled with fluid. This and all of the other brain structures you
should know are explained in Chapter 7. You can look ahead if you wish, but you won’t need to know
details of brain structure or function in the first six chapters. — EDS.]
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prosecution’s expert witnesses said the scans looked normal. Whether imaging
influenced the verdict is not known, but Hinckley was found not guilty by reason
of insanity.
Over the next decade, lawyers gradually switched to positron emission
tomography (PET), which can be used to give a measure of metabolic activity
in the brain. Gur’s research team has scanned dozens of patients with mental
illness and hundreds of healthy volunteers using PET and structural MRI — a
technique that looks at the static structure of the brain and is more established
for diagnosis than fMRI. Through his research, he has developed algorithms
that can predict whether a person has schizophrenia, for example, from structural MRI alone with about 80% accuracy. Gur has testified in roughly 30
criminal cases on behalf of defendants alleged to have schizophrenia or
brain damage.
‘‘We determine whether the values are normal or abnormal,’’ Gur says. ‘‘It’s a
challenge to explain that to a jury, but when they understand, basically all I’m
telling them is that this is not someone who’s operating with a full deck. And
so, they may not be eligible for the harshest punishment possible.’’ Gur gets so
many requests to testify that he has a team of psychology residents and interns to
vet them. Still, he doesn’t think that fMRI is reliable enough for legal settings. ‘‘If
somebody asked me to debunk an fMRI testimony, it wouldn’t be too hard,’’ Gur
says.
That’s mainly because fMRI studies deal in average differences between
groups. For example, Kiehl’s work has shown that, when processing abstract
words, psychopathic prisoners have lower activity in some brain regions than
non-psychopathic prisoners and non-prisoners. But there’s bound to be overlap.
He has not shown, for example, that any one person showing a specific brain signature is guaranteed, with some percent certainty, to be a psychopath or behave
like one. . . .
Taking the Stand
On October 29, Kiehl participated in a ‘‘Frye hearing’’ for Dugan’s case. Based
on a 1923 ruling, the hearing determines whether scientific evidence is robust
enough to be admitted.* Joseph Birkett, the lead prosecutor in the Dugan case,
argued that allowing the scans — the bright colors and statistical parameters of
which are chosen by the researchers — might bias the jury. Some studies, prosecutors argued, have shown that neuroscientific explanations can be particularly
seductive to the layperson.
The judge ultimately ‘‘cut the baby in half,’’ says Birkett. He ruled that the jury
would not be allowed to see Dugan’s actual brain scans, but that Kiehl could
describe them and how he interpreted them based on his research.

* [See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the evidentiary rules that govern the admissibility of expert
evidence. Under Frye (discussed at length in Chapter 6) the court decides whether the proffered
evidence has ‘‘gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’’ Frye is no longer
the standard in many states and in the federal courts, which apply a different rule called the Daubert
standard (named after the Daubert case, also presented in Chapter 6). — EDS.]
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On November 5, Kiehl took the stand for about six hours. He described the
findings of two three-hour psychiatric interviews with Dugan. Dugan had scored 38
out of a possible 40 on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, which evaluates 20 aspects
of personality and behavior through a semi-structured interview. (It was developed
by Kiehl’s graduate-school mentor, Robert Hare.) That puts him in the 99.5th
percentile of all inmates, Kiehl says.
Using PowerPoint slides of bar graphs and cartoon brains — but not the
scans — Kiehl testified that Dugan’s brain, like those of psychopaths in his other
studies, showed decreased levels of activity in specific areas. Prosecutors, Kiehl says,
went to great lengths to sow confusion about the data. . . .
The next day, the prosecution brought a rebuttal witness: Jonathan Brodie, a
psychiatrist at New York University. He refuted the imaging evidence on several
grounds.
First, there was timing: Kiehl scanned Dugan 26 years after he killed Nicarico.
It was impossible to know what was going on in Dugan’s brain while he was committing the act, and it was perhaps not surprising that his brain would look like a
murderer’s after committing murder. Second, Brodie said, there was the issue with
average versus individual differences. If you look at professional basketball players,
most of them are tall, he told the jury, but not everyone over six foot six is a basketball player.
From a technical perspective, Kiehl’s work is expertly done, says Brodie. ‘‘I
have no issue with his science. I have an issue with what he did with it. I think
it was just a terrible leap.’’
Even if fMRI could reliably diagnose psychopathy, it wouldn’t necessarily
reduce a defendant’s culpability in the eyes of a judge or jury. Ultimately, the
law is based on an individual’s rational, intentional action, not brain anatomy
or blood flow, says Stephen Morse, professor of law and psychiatry at the University
of Pennsylvania. ‘‘Brains don’t kill people. People kill people,’’ says Morse, who
also co-directs the MacArthur Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience Project, which
brings together scientists, lawyers, and judges to debate how brain technology
should be used in legal settings.
Change of Heart
Dugan’s sentencing proceedings ended four days after Brodie’s testimony.
The jury deliberated for less than an hour before coming back with a verdict:
ten for the death penalty and two for life in prison — a death sentence requires
a unanimous vote.
But while waiting for the Nicarico family to return to the courtroom, one of
the jurors asked for more time and the judge agreed. The jury asked for copies of
several transcripts of testimony, including Kiehl’s, and went back into deliberation.
The next day, all 12 jurors voted to send Dugan to his death.
Even with the unfavorable final verdict, Kiehl’s testimony ‘‘turned it from a
slam dunk for the prosecution into a much tougher case,’’ says Steve Greenberg,
Dugan’s lawyer. . . .
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Navigating Neuroscience: Who Does What?
If a lawyer needs to consult someone with expert knowledge about the brain,
who should she call? The answer to this question is somewhat complex because
of the variety of specialized educational degrees, areas of expertise, and titles
that surround medical and scientific work on the brain. Furthermore, the prefix
‘‘neuro-’’ fits so well in front of so many words (like neurolaw) that it may lead to
confusion about who actually works directly with the brain.
To start, it’s useful to know that we have not had a meaningful sense of
what the brain actually does until very recently in human history. For example,
Aristotle thought the brain distilled food vapors. When the modern scientific
study of the brain began in the seventeenth century, it was called ‘‘neurology’’.
Today neurology is understood to apply particularly to an area of medicine
concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of disorders of the nervous system.
Thus, a ‘‘neurologist’’ is an MD who has specialized training to deal with disorders, such as epilepsy or Parkinson’s disease, as well as traumatic brain injury. A
‘‘psychiatrist’’ is also an MD but with specialization in diagnosing and treating
disorders such as schizophrenia or depression. The boundary between neurology and psychiatry is becoming blurrier as we appreciate the brain basis of
cognitive and emotional disorders. Thus, you will be able to find individuals
who specialize in ‘‘neuropsychiatry.’’ Other MDs are known as ‘‘radiologists’’;
they know how to use various technologies such as X-ray, ultrasound, computed
tomography (CT), positron emission tomography (PET), and magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) to diagnose or treat diseases.
The MD degree entails the authority to deliver treatments such as prescribing drugs. The PhD degree does not entail this authority. The PhD degree is
awarded for scientific research.
The term ‘‘neuroscience’’ was not used before the 1970s. Before that
researchers who studied the brain and behavior earned PhD degrees in anatomy, physiology, or psychology. Today, many universities also grant a PhD
degree in neuroscience. It is important to appreciate, though, that researchers
working on the brain have a generally common educational background
regardless of the discipline in which their PhD is granted. Broadly speaking, neuroscience research is conducted by individuals with a variety of labels such as
neuroscientist, neurobiologist, and even psychologist.
You will also probably encounter a ‘‘forensic psychologist’’ or ‘‘forensic
psychiatrist.’’ Such individuals work particularly at the intersection of law and
psychology, and some subset of these professionals engage in neurosciencerelated cases.
One category of PhD a lawyer may interact with in particular is referred to as
a ‘‘neuropsychologist.’’ This is a rather vague term, but in the American medical
domain it identifies individuals who perform various psychological tests to evaluate the effects or location of brain damage. Neuropsychologists, neurologists,
and psychiatrists often work together on cases.

9

10

Chapter 1. Overview of the Issues

Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co.
No. 215512, 2000 WL 33421451 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000)

PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking specific performance of a
written agreement between them and the late Harold N. Piper to purchase approximately five hundred acres of farmland and a wheat crop from Piper, and seeking
damages for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court found that Piper
was mentally incompetent to enter the agreement, and that the circumstances
were such that reasonable persons in plaintiffs’ position would have been put
on notice that they should inquire further regarding Piper’s mental competence
before proceeding with the agreement. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right, challenging the trial court’s order dismissing their complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
Plaintiffs first argue that the evidence of Piper’s mental incompetence in
March 1995 was insufficient to provide them with notice and require them to
investigate his mental ability before proceeding with the transaction. We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and defers to the
trial court’s resolution of factual issues, especially where it involves the credibility
of witnesses. A trial court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
. . . ‘‘The test of mental capacity to contract is whether the person in question
possesses sufficient mind to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
effect of the act in which the person is engaged. To avoid a contract it must appear
not only that the person was of unsound mind or insane when it was made, but that
the un-soundness or insanity was of such a character that the person had no reasonable perception of the nature or terms of the contract.’’
Timothy Piper testified that, in the fall of 1992, Rodney Van Middlesworth
dried and sold some corn for Piper pursuant to the latter’s request, and after
Rodney gave Piper the figures involved in the transaction and settled with him,
Piper later questioned the calculations and wondered whether he had been paid
enough. Rodney then came back and went over the calculations with Piper a
second time. Timothy also testified that, in 1993, Rodney agreed to haul and
sell part of Piper’s corn crop, and Piper believed that Rodney had hauled more
bushels than Piper had requested to be hauled. As a result, Piper quit hauling or
selling corn for a period of time, and Rodney told Timothy that, in the future,
Timothy would have to verify what Piper wanted in order to avoid any more discrepancies. Also, on one occasion Piper asked Rodney to haul a couple of loads of
corn for him, and Timothy did not confirm Piper’s order because the corn was not
ready to haul. In January 1995, Rodney hauled two almost identically sized loads of
beans to the market for Piper, receiving a separate check for each load. Piper
thought he had been paid twice for the same load of beans, and it took Rodney
half a day ‘‘to sort it out and make sure that he hadn’t been.’’ Rodney was also
questioned about his deposition statement referring to an April 11, 1995, meeting
with Piper, regarding which Rodney stated, ‘‘He acted like he didn’t know what I
was talking about. He acted like he had no idea what he was talking about.’’
Another indication that Rodney Van Middlesworth had notice that Piper was
mentally incompetent occurred in relation to a police report that Piper apparently
filed on April 28, 1995, accusing Rodney of assaulting him. From all that appears in

A. Introducing Neuroscientific Evidence

the record, Piper’s charge was false. When questioned about this incident at trial,
Rodney denied having told the investigating police officer on May 1, 1995, that
Piper’s ‘‘mind was starting to go,’’ but he was impeached with an excerpt of his
deposition testimony in which he acknowledged having made such a statement.
Although these latter incidents occurred some weeks after Piper signed the
sales agreement, we believe it reasonable to assume that Rodney’s expressed belief
on several dates so soon after the transaction that Piper’s ‘‘mind is starting to go’’
can be extrapolated backward in time to Piper’s condition on March 13, 1995, thus
constituting further indication that plaintiffs were on notice regarding Piper’s possible mental incompetence.
Additionally, the trial court placed reliance on the fact that three of the four
expert witnesses testified to Piper’s deteriorated mental state. The first witness, a
clinical psychologist, concluded from his examination that Piper’s reasoning
would have been significantly impaired on and around March 13, 1995 to the
extent that he would not have been able to understand the offer to purchase
his real estate. The second witness, a neurologist, examined the results of Piper’s
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), found evidence of brain shrinkage and hardening of the arteries, and opined that the MRI was consistent with dementia both
at the time of the MRI and in March 1995. The third expert witness, a physician
specializing in geriatric neurology, concluded that Piper suffered from a combination of Alzheimer’s disease and multi-infarct dementia, and that Piper was mentally incompetent at the time of examination as well as in March 1995. Although
plaintiffs presented a psychiatric expert witness of their own who came to a
contrary conclusion, we give much weight to the opinion of the trial judge who
was in the best position to consider and evaluate the testimony of these
witnesses. . . .
Plaintiffs argue that defense counsel’s closing argument reflects defense counsel’s own belief that plaintiffs had no knowledge of Piper’s incompetence at the
time the sales agreement was executed. During his remarks, counsel stated that he
did not believe that plaintiffs ‘‘entered into those negotiations saying to themselves, ‘Harold is incompetent and we are going to take advantage of him.’’’ Whatever counsel may have meant by these remarks, they do not negate the evidence of
Piper’s mental incompetence in March 1995, nor do they relieve plaintiffs of their
obligation to inquire regarding Piper’s competence before proceeding with the
transaction. . . . Having examined counsel’s statement in context, we conclude
that it was not meant as a formal admission, but was rather merely part of counsel’s
rhetoric during argument, charitably suggesting that plaintiffs did not intend to
take advantage of an incompetent old man.
Plaintiffs also contend that, even if Piper were mentally incompetent at the
time of the agreement, the resulting contract is voidable, not void, and should
be set aside only if its terms are unjust or unfair to Piper. However, the trial
court determined that the fairness of the contract was affected due to a $75,000
discrepancy between the sale price and the price the property could have brought
at auction, a below-market interest rate, and ‘‘the fact that it’s the family homestead and . . . we’d have to look into the competency of anybody deeding out the
family homestead.’’ . . .
Moreover, there is no inequity in the trial court’s decision to declare the agreement void because the agreement involved only an acceptance of an offer to
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purchase Piper’s farm, and plaintiffs neither paid Piper for the farm, nor received
title from him. As this Court stated in Star Realty, Inc v. Bower, ‘‘The integrity of
written contracts must be preserved, but so must an incompetent be protected
against his own folly. . . . The evidence presented does not preponderate for
specific performance as equitable relief.’’ There was no error. . . . Affirmed.

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. What did the commentator mean when he said that the judge in Dugan ‘‘cut the
baby in half’’ with regards to the scientific evidence? What do you think led the
judge to rule that way? And, on the information here, how would you likely
have approached the admissibility question? Chapter 6 on Neuroscience in
the Courtroom will introduce the rules of scientific evidence in more detail.
But note in the meantime that in the federal system, and in many states, the
rules for admissibility are different in the guilt and sentencing phases.
2. Admissibility concerns often involve juror reaction to the proffered evidence. But
what about judges? In 2012, Lisa G. Aspinwall, Teneille R. Brown, and James
Tabery published a study with 181 U.S. state trial judges as subjects in an online
experiment. The results suggest that judges’ sentencing decisions may be
affected by the introduction of biomechanical evidence. The researchers
found that ‘‘. . . despite the significant variability among states when it came
to sentencing, the addition of a biomechanism for psychopathy significantly
reduced the sentence and significantly reduced the degree to which psychopathy
was rated as aggravating.’’ Lisa G. Aspinwall, et. al, The Double-Edged Sword: Does
Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths? 17 Science 846,
847 (2012). Are you surprised at this result? If the same effect were seen in actual
cases, what, if anything, should the legal system do to respond?
3. In Dugan, neuroscientist Kent Kiehl suggested that we now know much about the
psychopathic brain. Should that knowledge be relevant at sentencing? Neuroscientist David Eagleman argues that ‘‘[t]he punishment has to fit the brain.’’ Talk
of the Nation: David Eagleman Gets Inside Our Heads, National Public Radio (Aug.
24, 2012). Do you agree, and what would this mean in practice? How would you
define the threshold level of brain dysfunction necessary for a defendant to be
considered as suffering from a brain dysfunction, and thus eligible for a reduced
or alternative sentence? Should a defendant asserting such a claim be required to
prove that he or she not only suffers from such a disorder but also acted because of
the disorder at the time of the crime?
4. In 2012 an Italian pediatrician, Domenico Mattiello, was accused of pedophilia.
Colleagues could not understand why he acted this way: ‘‘He was a pediatrician
for 30 something years and he saw tens of thousands of children and never had
any problem. The question is why, at some point, did someone who has always
behaved properly suddenly change so drastically?’’ An MRI revealed a brain
tumor, and at his defense Dr. Mattiello argued that this brain tumor made
him act in the way he did. Kate Kelland, Neuroscience in Court: My Brain Made
Me Do It (Aug. 29, 2012). This and other international developments raise questions about comparative neurolaw. To what extent do different legal regimes and
different cultural attitudes affect the role of neuroscience in law?
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5. What role do you think neuroscientific evidence played in Van Middlesworth?
What factors do you think led the defense attorneys to pursue it and include
it? What issues would have arisen if, holding all other facts equal, the brain
scans had shown nothing unusual?
6. Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga cautions that ‘‘exciting as the advances that
neuroscience is making every day are, all of us should look with caution at how
they may gradually come to be incorporated into our culture. The legal relevance
of neuroscientific discoveries is only part of the picture. Might we someday want
brain scans of our fiancées, business partners, or politicians, even if the results
could not stand up in court?’’ Michael S. Gazzaniga, Neuroscience in the Courtroom,
304 Scientific American 54, 59 (2011). How might and should the legal system
respond to these possible implications of neuroscience in society?
7. Law professor Stephen Morse has written that ‘‘Brains do not commit crimes;
people commit crimes. This conclusion should be self-evident, but, infected and
inflamed by stunning advances in our understanding of the brain, advocates all
too often make moral and legal claims that the new neuroscience does not entail
and cannot sustain.’’ Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 397, 397 (2006). What do
you think are the likely limits of neuroscience-based defenses, whether to a
criminal charge or contractual dispute? If people, not brains, commit crimes,
and people, not brains, sign contracts, were the courts mistaken to admit
brain science in their adjudication of the cases above?
8. In Chapter 11 you will read about brain injuries, including brain injuries experienced through participation in contact sports such as football. In some instances,
former athletes who suffered a brain injury find themselves as criminal defendants and argue that their brain trauma is relevant to explaining, and perhaps
excusing, their violent actions. One prosecutor, in a case in which a former football player killed his girlfriend, argued that ‘‘There is no psychosis fairy who
magically sprinkles a dose of psychosis on this defendant. . . . The time for blaming football, the time for blaming marijuana, the time for blaming the victim is
over.’’ Melinda Henneberger, Blaming Football in Lauren Astley’s Killing, Wash.
Post (Mar. 6, 2013). Is the prosecutor’s characterization of this brain-based
defense a useful one? Why or why not?
9. While law often looks backward to assess a mental state at a previous time, society
and the criminal justice system also frequently look forward to make a prediction
about an individual’s likelihood of doing something bad. In 2013 a group of
researchers published a study finding that anterior cingulate cortex activation,
associated with a laboratory impulse control task, could aid in the prediction of
future re-arrest. The researchers noted, however, that ‘‘Should the neuroimaging effects be robust to replication, they remain silent on the question of
suitability in making individual-level predictions. Whether neurobiological markers should ever be used to make predictions about individual offenders’ risk is a
thorny question that, at the least, depends on (i) whether these estimates can
survive particular sensitivity and specificity thresholds with the use of large
random samples, (ii) whether they can survive a required legal standard of
proof, and (iii) whether their use would violate offender rights.’’ Eyal Aharoni
et al., Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6223, 6224
(2013). How would you address these thorny issues?
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B. THE BRAIN ON THE STAND
Jeffrey Rosen

The Brain on the Stand
N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 11, 2007

I. Mr. Weinstein’s Cyst. When historians of the future try to identify the moment that
neuroscience began to transform the American legal system, they may point to a
little-noticed case from the early 1990s. The case involved Herbert Weinstein, a 65year-old ad executive who was charged with strangling his wife, Barbara, to death
and then, in an effort to make the murder look like a suicide, throwing her body out
the window of their 12th-floor apartment on East 72nd Street in Manhattan. Before
the trial began, Weinstein’s lawyer suggested that his client should not be held
responsible for his actions because of a mental defect — namely, an abnormal cyst
nestled in his arachnoid membrane, which surrounds the brain like a spider web.
The implications of the claim were considerable. American law holds people
criminally responsible unless they act under duress (with a gun pointed at the
head, for example) or if they suffer from a serious defect in rationality — like
not being able to tell right from wrong. But if you suffer from such a serious defect,
the law generally doesn’t care why — whether it’s an unhappy childhood or an
arachnoid cyst or both. To suggest that criminals could be excused because
their brains made them do it seems to imply that anyone whose brain isn’t functioning properly could be absolved of responsibility. But should judges and juries
really be in the business of defining the normal or properly working brain? And
since all behavior is caused by our brains, wouldn’t this mean all behavior could
potentially be excused?
The prosecution at first tried to argue that evidence of Weinstein’s arachnoid
cyst shouldn’t be admitted in court. One of the government’s witnesses, a forensic
psychologist named Daniel Martell, testified that brain-scanning technologies were
new and untested, and their implications weren’t yet widely accepted by the scientific community. Ultimately, on Oct. 8, 1992, Judge Richard Carruthers issued a
Solomonic ruling: Weinstein’s lawyers could tell the jury that brain scans had identified an arachnoid cyst, but they couldn’t tell jurors that arachnoid cysts were
associated with violence. Even so, the prosecution team seemed to fear that simply
exhibiting images of Weinstein’s brain in court would sway the jury. Eleven days
later, on the morning of jury selection, they agreed to let Weinstein plead guilty in
exchange for a reduced charge of manslaughter.
After the Weinstein case, Daniel Martell found himself in so much demand to
testify as an expert witness that he started a consulting business called Forensic
Neuroscience. Hired by defense teams and prosecutors alike, he has testified
over the past 15 years in several hundred criminal and civil cases. In those
cases, neuroscientific evidence has been admitted to show everything from head
trauma to the tendency of violent video games to make children behave aggressively. But Martell told me that it’s in death-penalty litigation that neuroscience
evidence is having its most revolutionary effect. ‘‘Some sort of organic brain
defense has become de rigueur in any sort of capital defense,’’ he said. Lawyers
routinely order scans of convicted defendants’ brains and argue that a neurological impairment prevented them from controlling themselves. The prosecution
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counters that the evidence shouldn’t be admitted, but under the relaxed standards
for mitigating evidence during capital sentencing, it usually is. Indeed, a Florida
court has held that the failure to admit neuroscience evidence during capital sentencing is grounds for a reversal.* Martell remains skeptical about the worth of the
brain scans, but he observes that they’ve ‘‘revolutionized the law.’’
The extent of that revolution is hotly debated, but the influence of what some
call neurolaw is clearly growing. Neuroscientific evidence has persuaded jurors to
sentence defendants to life imprisonment rather than to death; courts have also
admitted brain-imaging evidence during criminal trials to support claims that
defendants like John W. Hinckley Jr., who tried to assassinate President Reagan,
are insane. Carter Snead, a law professor at Notre Dame, drafted a staff working
paper on the impact of neuroscientific evidence in criminal law for President
Bush’s Council on Bioethics. The report concludes that neuroimaging evidence
is of mixed reliability but ‘‘the large number of cases in which such evidence is
presented is striking.’’ That number will no doubt increase substantially. Proponents of neurolaw say that neuroscientific evidence will have a large impact not
only on questions of guilt and punishment, but also on the detection of lies and
hidden bias and on the prediction of future criminal behavior. At the same time,
skeptics fear that the use of brain-scanning technology as a kind of super mindreading device will threaten our privacy and mental freedom, leading some to call
for the legal system to respond with a new concept of ‘‘cognitive liberty.’’ . . .
Owen Jones, a professor of law and biology at Vanderbilt . . . has joined a
group of prominent neuroscientists and law professors who have [received] . . . a
large MacArthur Foundation grant; they hope to study a wide range of neurolaw
questions, like: Do sexual offenders and violent teenagers show unusual patterns
of brain activity? Is it possible to capture brain images of chronic neck pain when
someone claims to have suffered whiplash? . . . Jones . . . with René Marois, a neuroscientist in the psychology department . . . has begun a study of how the human
brain reacts when asked to impose various punishments. . . . Marois explained that
he and Jones wanted to study the interactions among the emotion-generating
regions of the brain, like the amygdala, and the prefrontal regions responsible
for reason. ‘‘It is also possible that the prefrontal cortex is critical for attributing
punishment, making the essential decision about what kind of punishment to
assign,’’ he suggested. . . . [Other e]xperiments might help to develop a deeper
understanding of the criminal brain, or of the typical brain predisposed to
criminal activity. [For an introduction to these brain regions, see discussion in
Chapter 7.]
III. The End of Responsibility? Indeed, as the use of functional M.R.I. results
becomes increasingly common in courtrooms, judges and juries may be asked

* [The case referred to is: Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003). The court, in
analyzing mitigating evidence, stated that the statutory factor of the defendant’s ability to ‘‘conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law’’ was most significant. Evidence regarding the defendant’s
drunk, drugged, and sleepy condition was not presented to the judge and jury. Furthermore, the court
held that the ‘‘jury may not be prohibited from considering relevant non-statutory mitigating
circumstances . . .’’ and cites the example ‘‘dysfunctional family life and the mental and physical abuse
that he endured during his childhood and teen years.’’ The court upheld the defendant’s conviction
but vacated the death sentence due to the lack of submitted evidence regarding the defendant’s mental
state and capabilities. — EDS.]
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to draw new and sometimes troubling lines between ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘abnormal’’
brains. Ruben Gur, a professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania
School of Medicine, specializes in doing just that. Gur began his expert-witness
career in the mid-1990s when a colleague asked him to help in the trial of a convicted serial killer in Florida named Bobby Joe Long. Known as the ‘‘classified-ad
rapist,’’ because he would respond to classified ads placed by women offering to
sell household items, then rape and kill them, Long was sentenced to death after
he committed at least nine murders in Tampa. Gur was called as a national expert
in positron-emission tomography, or PET scans, in which patients are injected with
a solution containing radioactive markers that illuminate their brain activity.* After
examining Long’s PET scans, Gur testified that a motorcycle accident that had left
Long in a coma had also severely damaged his amygdala. It was after emerging
from the coma that Long committed his first rape.
‘‘I didn’t have the sense that my testimony had a profound impact,’’ Gur told
me recently . . . but he has testified at more than 20 capital cases since then. He
wrote a widely circulated affidavit arguing that adolescents are not as capable of
controlling their impulses as adults because the development of neurons in the
prefrontal cortex isn’t complete until the early 20s. Based on that affidavit, Gur was
asked to contribute to the preparation of one of the briefs filed by neuroscientists
and others in Roper v. Simmons, the landmark case in which a divided Supreme
Court struck down the death penalty for offenders who committed crimes when
they were under the age of 18.
The leading neurolaw brief in the case, filed by the American Medical Association and other groups, argued that because ‘‘adolescent brains are not fully
developed’’ in the prefrontal regions, adolescents are less able than adults to
control their impulses and should not be held fully accountable ‘‘for the immaturity of their neural anatomy.’’ In his majority decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy
declared that, ‘‘as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies’’
cited in the briefs ‘‘tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults.’’’ Although
Kennedy did not cite the neuroscience evidence specifically, his indirect reference
to the scientific studies in the briefs led some supporters and critics to view the
decision as the Brown v. Board of Education of neurolaw.
One important question raised by the Roper case was the question of where to
draw the line in considering neuroscience evidence as a legal mitigation or excuse.
Should courts be in the business of deciding when to mitigate someone’s criminal
responsibility because his brain functions improperly, whether because of age,
inborn defects, or trauma? As we learn more about criminals’ brains, will we
have to redefine our most basic ideas of justice?
Two of the most ardent supporters of the claim that neuroscience requires the
redefinition of guilt and punishment are Joshua D. Greene, an assistant professor
of psychology at Harvard, and Jonathan D. Cohen, a professor of psychology who
directs the neuroscience program at Princeton. Greene got Cohen interested in

* [Long subsequently entered into a plea agreement for eight of the murders and, after multiple
appeals and remands, was spared the death penalty for the ninth murder in an acquittal due to
evidentiary discrepancies. Long v. State, 689 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1997). — EDS.]
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the legal implications of neuroscience, and together they conducted a series of
experiments exploring how people’s brains react to moral dilemmas involving
life and death. In particular, they wanted to test people’s responses in the fMRI
scanner to variations of the famous trolley problem, which philosophers have been
arguing about for decades.
The trolley problem goes something like this: Imagine a train heading toward
five people who are going to die if you don’t do anything. If you hit a switch, the
train veers onto a side track and kills another person. Most people confronted with
this scenario say it’s O.K. to hit the switch. By contrast, imagine that you’re
standing on a footbridge that spans the train tracks, and the only way you can
save the five people is to push an obese man standing next to you off the footbridge so that his body stops the train. Under these circumstances, most people say
it’s not O.K. to kill one person to save five.
‘‘I wondered why people have such clear intuitions,’’ Greene told me, ‘‘and
the core idea was to confront people with these two cases in the scanner and see if
we got more of an emotional response in one case and reasoned response in the
other.’’ As it turns out, that’s precisely what happened: Greene and Cohen found
that the brain region associated with deliberate problem solving and self-control,
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, was especially active when subjects confronted
the first trolley hypothetical, in which most of them made a utilitarian judgment
about how to save the greatest number of lives. By contrast, emotional centers in
the brain were more active when subjects confronted the second trolley hypothetical, in which they tended to recoil at the idea of personally harming an individual,
even under such wrenching circumstances. ‘‘This suggests that moral judgment is
not a single thing; it’s intuitive emotional responses and then cognitive responses
that are duking it out,’’ Greene said.
‘‘To a neuroscientist, you are your brain; nothing causes your behavior other
than the operations of your brain,’’ Greene says. ‘‘If that’s right, it radically
changes the way we think about the law. The official line in the law is all that
matters is whether you’re rational, but you can have someone who is totally rational
but whose strings are being pulled by something beyond his control.’’ In other
words, even someone who has the illusion of making a free and rational choice
between soup and salad may be deluding himself, since the choice of salad over
soup is ultimately predestined by forces hard-wired in his brain. Greene insists that
this insight means that the criminal-justice system should abandon the idea of
retribution — the idea that bad people should be punished because they have
freely chosen to act immorally — which has been the focus of American criminal
law since the 1970s, when rehabilitation went out of fashion. Instead, Greene says,
the law should focus on deterring future harms. In some cases, he supposes, this
might mean lighter punishments. ‘‘If it’s really true that we don’t get any prevention bang from our punishment buck when we punish that person, then it’s not
worth punishing that person,’’ he says. (On the other hand, Carter Snead, the
Notre Dame scholar, maintains that capital defendants who are not considered
fully blameworthy under current rules could be executed more readily under a
system that focused on preventing future harms.)
Others agree with Greene and Cohen that the legal system should be radically
refocused on deterrence rather than on retribution. Since the celebrated
M’Naughten case in 1843, involving a paranoid British assassin, English and

17

18

Chapter 1. Overview of the Issues

American courts have recognized an insanity defense only for those who are
unable to appreciate the difference between right and wrong. (This is consistent
with the idea that only rational people can be held criminally responsible for their
actions.) According to some neuroscientists, that rule makes no sense in light of
recent brain-imaging studies. ‘‘You can have a horrendously damaged brain where
someone knows the difference between right and wrong but nonetheless can’t
control their behavior,’’ says Robert Sapolsky, a neurobiologist at Stanford. ‘‘At
that point, you’re dealing with a broken machine, and concepts like punishment
and evil and sin become utterly irrelevant. Does that mean the person should be
dumped back on the street? Absolutely not. You have a car with the brakes not
working, and it shouldn’t be allowed to be near anyone it can hurt.’’
Even as these debates continue, some skeptics contend that both the hopes
and fears attached to neurolaw are overblown. ‘‘There’s nothing new about the
neuroscience ideas of responsibility; it’s just another material, causal explanation
of human behavior,’’ says Stephen J. Morse, professor of law and psychiatry at the
University of Pennsylvania. ‘‘How is this different than the Chicago school of sociology,’’ which tried to explain human behavior in terms of environment and social
structures? ‘‘How is it different from genetic explanations or psychological explanations? The only thing different about neuroscience is that we have prettier pictures and it appears more scientific.’’
Morse insists that ‘‘brains do not commit crimes; people commit crimes’’ — a
conclusion he suggests has been ignored by advocates who, ‘‘infected and
inflamed by stunning advances in our understanding of the brain . . . all too
often make moral and legal claims that the new neuroscience . . . cannot sustain.’’
He calls this ‘‘brain overclaim syndrome’’ and cites as an example the neuroscience briefs filed in the Supreme Court case Roper v. Simmons to question the
juvenile death penalty. ‘‘What did the neuroscience add?’’ he asks. If adolescent
brains caused all adolescent behavior, ‘‘we would expect the rates of homicide to
be the same for 16- and 17-year-olds everywhere in the world — their brains are
alike — but, in fact, the homicide rates of Danish and Finnish youths are very
different than American youths.’’ Morse agrees that our brains bring about our
behavior — ‘‘I’m a thoroughgoing materialist, who believes that all mental and
behavioral activity is the causal product of physical events in the brain’’ — but
he disagrees that the law should excuse certain kinds of criminal conduct as a
result. ‘‘It’s a total non sequitur,’’ he says. ‘‘So what if there’s biological causation?
Causation can’t be an excuse for someone who believes that responsibility is possible. Since all behavior is caused, this would mean all behavior has to be excused.’’
Morse cites the case of Charles Whitman, a man who, in 1966, killed his wife and
his mother, then climbed up a tower at the University of Texas and shot and killed
13 more people before being shot by police officers. Whitman was discovered after
an autopsy to have a tumor that was putting pressure on his amygdala. ‘‘Even if his
amygdala made him more angry and volatile, since when are anger and volatility
excusing conditions?’’ Morse asks. ‘‘Some people are angry because they had bad
mommies and daddies and others because their amygdalas are mucked up. The
question is: When should anger be an excusing condition?’’
Still, Morse concedes that there are circumstances under which new discoveries from neuroscience could challenge the legal system at its core. ‘‘Suppose neuroscience could reveal that reason actually plays no role in determining human

B. The Brain on the Stand

behavior,’’ he suggests tantalizingly. ‘‘Suppose I could show you that your intentions and your reasons for your actions are post hoc rationalizations that somehow
your brain generates to explain to you what your brain has already done’’ without
your conscious participation. If neuroscience could reveal us to be automatons in
this respect, Morse is prepared to agree with Greene and Cohen that criminal law
would have to abandon its current ideas about responsibility and seek other ways of
protecting society.
Some scientists are already pushing in this direction. In a series of famous
experiments in the 1970s and ’80s, Benjamin Libet measured people’s brain activity while telling them to move their fingers whenever they felt like it. Libet detected
brain activity suggesting a readiness to move the finger half a second before the
actual movement and about 400 milliseconds before people became aware of their
conscious intention to move their finger. Libet argued that this leaves 100 milliseconds for the conscious self to veto the brain’s unconscious decision, or to give way
to it — suggesting, in the words of the neuroscientist Vilayanur S. Ramachandran,
that we have not free will but ‘‘free won’t.’’
Morse is not convinced that the Libet experiments reveal us to be helpless
automatons. But he does think that the study of our decision-making powers
could bear some fruit for the law. ‘‘I’m interested,’’ he says, ‘‘in people who suffer
from drug addictions, psychopaths and people who have intermittent explosive
disorder — that’s people who have no general rationality problem other than
they just go off.’’ In other words, Morse wants to identify the neural triggers
that make people go postal. ‘‘Suppose we could show that the higher deliberative
centers in the brain seem to be disabled in these cases,’’ he says. ‘‘If these are
people who cannot control episodes of gross irrationality, we’ve learned something
that might be relevant to the legal ascription of responsibility.’’ That doesn’t mean
they would be let off the hook, he emphasizes: ‘‘You could give people a prison
sentence and an opportunity to get fixed.’’
IV. Putting the Unconscious on Trial. If debates over criminal responsibility long
predate the fMRI, so do debates over the use of lie-detection technology. What’s
new is the prospect that lie detectors in the courtroom will become much more
accurate, and correspondingly more intrusive. There are, at the moment, two liedetection technologies that rely on neuroimaging, although the value and accuracy of both are sharply contested. The first, developed by Lawrence Farwell in the
1980s, is known as ‘‘brain fingerprinting.’’ Subjects put on an electrode-filled helmet that measures a brain wave called p300, which, according to Farwell, changes
its frequency when people recognize images, pictures, sights, and smells. After
showing a suspect pictures of familiar places and measuring his p300 activation
patterns, government officials could, at least in theory, show a suspect pictures
of places he may or may not have seen before — a Qaeda training camp, for
example, or a crime scene — and compare the activation patterns. (By detecting
not only lies but also honest cases of forgetfulness, the technology could expand
our very idea of lie detection.)
The second lie-detection technology uses fMRI machines to compare the brain
activity of liars and truth tellers. It is based on a test called Guilty Knowledge, developed by Daniel Langleben at the University of Pennsylvania in 2001. Langleben gave
subjects a playing card before they entered the magnet and told them to answer no
to a series of questions, including whether they had the card in question.
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Langleben and his colleagues found that certain areas of the brain lit up when
people lied.
Two companies, No Lie MRI and Cephos, are now competing to refine fMRI
lie-detection technology so that it can be admitted in court and commercially marketed. I talked to Steven Laken, the president of Cephos, which plans to begin
selling its products this year. ‘‘We have two to three people who call every single
week,’’ he told me. ‘‘They’re in legal proceedings throughout the world, and
they’re looking to bolster their credibility.’’ Laken said the technology could
have ‘‘tremendous applications’’ in civil and criminal cases. On the government
side, he said, the technology could replace highly inaccurate polygraphs in screening for security clearances, as well as in trying to identify suspected terrorists’ native
languages and close associates. ‘‘In lab studies, we’ve been in the 80- to 90-percentaccuracy range,’’ Laken says. This is similar to the accuracy rate for polygraphs,
which are not considered sufficiently reliable to be allowed in most legal cases.
Laken says he hopes to reach the 90-percent- to 95-percent-accuracy range — which
should be high enough to satisfy the Supreme Court’s standards for the admission
of scientific evidence. Judy Illes, director of Neuroethics at the Stanford Center for
Biomedical Ethics, says, ‘‘I would predict that within five years, we will have technology that is sufficiently reliable at getting at the binary question of whether
someone is lying that it may be utilized in certain legal settings.’’
If and when lie-detection fMRI’s are admitted in court, they will raise vexing
questions of self-incrimination and privacy. Hank Greely, a law professor and head
of the Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences, notes that prosecution and
defense witnesses might have their credibility questioned if they refused to take a
lie-detection fMRI, as might parties and witnesses in civil cases. Unless courts found
the tests to be shocking invasions of privacy, like stomach pumps, witnesses could
even be compelled to have their brains scanned. And equally vexing legal questions might arise as neuroimaging technologies move beyond telling whether or
not someone is lying and begin to identify the actual content of memories. Michael
Gazzaniga, a professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
and author of ‘‘The Ethical Brain,’’ notes that within 10 years, neuroscientists may
be able to show that there are neurological differences when people testify about
their own previous acts and when they testify to something they saw. ‘‘If you kill
someone, you have a procedural memory of that, whereas if I’m standing and
watch you kill somebody, that’s an episodic memory that uses a different part of
the brain,’’ he told me. Even if witnesses don’t have their brains scanned, neuroscience may lead judges and jurors to conclude that certain kinds of memories are
more reliable than others because of the area of the brain in which they are processed. Further into the future, and closer to science fiction, lies the possibility of
memory downloading. ‘‘One could even, just barely, imagine a technology that
might be able to ‘read out’ the witness’s memories, intercepted as neuronal firings,
and translate it directly into voice, text, or the equivalent of a movie,’’ Hank Greely
writes.
Greely acknowledges that lie-detection and memory-retrieval technologies like
this could pose a serious challenge to our freedom of thought, which is now
defended largely by the First Amendment protections for freedom of expression.
‘‘Freedom of thought has always been buttressed by the reality that you could only
tell what someone thought based on their behavior,’’ he told me. ‘‘This technology
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holds out the possibility of looking through the skull and seeing what’s really happening, seeing the thoughts themselves.’’ According to Greely, this may challenge
the principle that we should be held accountable for what we do, not what we
think. ‘‘It opens up for the first time the possibility of punishing people for
their thoughts rather than their actions,’’ he says. ‘‘One reason thought has
been free in the harshest dictatorships is that dictators haven’t been able to detect
it.’’ He adds, ‘‘Now they may be able to, putting greater pressure on legal
constraints against government interference with freedom of thought.’’
In the future, neuroscience could also revolutionize the way jurors are
selected. Steven Laken, the president of Cephos, says that jury consultants
might seek to put prospective jurors in fMRI’s. ‘‘You could give videotapes of
the lawyers and witnesses to people when they’re in the magnet and see what
parts of their brains light up,’’ he says. A situation like this would raise vexing
questions about jurors’ prejudices — and what makes for a fair trial. Recent experiments have suggested that people who believe themselves to be free of bias may
harbor plenty of it all the same.
The experiments, conducted by Elizabeth Phelps, who teaches psychology at
New York University, combine brain scans with a behavioral test known as the
Implicit Association Test, or I.A.T., as well as physiological tests of the startle reflex.
The I.A.T. flashes pictures of black and white faces at you and asks you to associate
various adjectives with the faces. Repeated tests have shown that white subjects take
longer to respond when they’re asked to associate black faces with positive adjectives and white faces with negative adjectives than vice versa, and this is said to be
an implicit measure of unconscious racism. Phelps and her colleagues added neurological evidence to this insight by scanning the brains and testing the startle
reflexes of white undergraduates at Yale before they took the I.A.T. She found
that the subjects who showed the most unconscious bias on the I.A.T. also had
the highest activation in their amygdalas — a center of threat perception — when
unfamiliar black faces were flashed at them in the scanner. By contrast, when subjects were shown pictures of familiar black and white figures — like Denzel Washington, Martin Luther King Jr., and Conan O’Brien — there was no jump in
amygdala activity.
The legal implications of the new experiments involving bias and neuroscience
are hotly disputed. Mahzarin R. Banaji, a psychology professor at Harvard who
helped to pioneer the I.A.T., has argued that there may be a big gap between
the concept of intentional bias embedded in law and the reality of unconscious
racism revealed by science. When the gap is ‘‘substantial,’’ she and the U.C.L.A.
law professor Jerry Kang have argued, ‘‘the law should be changed to comport with
science’’ — relaxing, for example, the current focus on intentional discrimination
and trying to root out unconscious bias in the workplace with ‘‘structural interventions,’’ which critics say may be tantamount to racial quotas. One legal scholar has
cited Phelps’s work to argue for the elimination of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors — if most whites are unconsciously racist, the argument goes, then
any decision to strike a black juror must be infected with racism. Much to her
displeasure, Phelps’s work has been cited by a journalist to suggest that a white
cop who accidentally shot a black teenager on a Brooklyn rooftop in 2004 must
have been responding to a hard-wired fear of unfamiliar black faces — a version of
the amygdala made me do it.
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Phelps herself says it’s ‘‘crazy’’ to link her work to cops who shoot on the job
and insists that it is too early to use her research in the courtroom. ‘‘Part of my
discomfort is that we haven’t linked what we see in the amygdala or any other
region of the brain with an activity outside the magnet that we would call racism,’’
she told me. ‘‘We have no evidence whatsoever that activity in the brain is more
predictive of things we care about in the courtroom than the behaviors themselves
that we correlate with brain function.’’ In other words, just because you have a
biased reaction to a photograph doesn’t mean you’ll act on those biases in the
workplace. Phelps is also concerned that jurors might be unduly influenced by
attention-grabbing pictures of brain scans. ‘‘Frank Keil, a psychologist at Yale,
has done research suggesting that, when you have a picture of a mechanism,
you have a tendency to overestimate how much you understand the mechanism,’’
she told me. Defense lawyers confirm this phenomenon. ‘‘Here was this nice color
image we could enlarge, that the medical expert could point to,’’ Christopher
Plourd, a San Diego criminal-defense lawyer, told the Los Angeles Times in the
early 1990s. ‘‘It documented that this guy had a rotten spot in his brain. The
jury glommed onto that.’’
Other scholars are even sharper critics of efforts to use scientific experiments
about unconscious bias to transform the law. ‘‘I regard that as an extraordinary
claim that you could screen potential jurors or judges for bias; it’s mind-boggling,’’
I was told by Philip Tetlock, professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley. Tetlock has argued that split-second associations
between images of African Americans and negative adjectives may reflect ‘‘simple
awareness of the social reality’’ that ‘‘some groups are more disadvantaged than
others.’’ He has also written that, according to psychologists, ‘‘there is virtually no
published research showing a systematic link between racist attitudes, overt or
subconscious, and real-world discrimination.’’ (A few studies show, Tetlock
acknowledges, that openly biased white people sometimes sit closer to whites
than blacks in experiments that simulate job hiring and promotion.) ‘‘A light
bulb going off in your brain means nothing unless it’s correlated with a particular
output, and the brain-scan stuff, heaven help us, we have barely linked that with
anything,’’ agrees Tetlock’s co-author, Amy Wax of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. ‘‘The claim that homeless people light up your amygdala more and
your frontal cortex less and we can infer that you will systematically dehumanize
homeless people — that’s piffle.’’
V. Are You Responsible for What You Might Do? The attempt to link unconscious
bias to actual acts of discrimination may be dubious. But are there other ways to
look inside the brain and make predictions about an individual’s future behavior?
And if so, should those discoveries be employed to make us safer? Efforts to use
science to predict criminal behavior have a disreputable history. In the nineteenth
century, the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso championed a theory of
‘‘biological criminality,’’ which held that criminals could be identified by physical
characteristics, like large jaws or bushy eyebrows. Nevertheless, neuroscientists are
trying to find the factors in the brain associated with violence. PET scans of convicted murderers were first studied in the late 1980s by Adrian Raine, a professor of
psychology at the University of Southern California; he found that their prefrontal
cortexes, areas associated with inhibition, had reduced glucose metabolism and
suggested that this might be responsible for their violent behavior. In a later
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study, Raine found that subjects who received a diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder, which correlates with violent behavior, had 11 percent less gray matter in
their prefrontal cortexes than control groups of healthy subjects and substance
abusers. His current research uses fMRI’s to study moral decision-making in
psychopaths.
Neuroscience, it seems, points two ways: it can absolve individuals of responsibility for acts they’ve committed, but it can also place individuals in jeopardy for
acts they haven’t committed — but might someday. ‘‘This opens up a Pandora’s
box in civilized society that I’m willing to fight against,’’ says Helen S. Mayberg, a
professor of psychiatry, behavioral sciences, and neurology at Emory University
School of Medicine, who has testified against the admission of neuroscience
evidence in criminal trials. ‘‘If you believe at the time of trial that the picture
informs us about what they were like at the time of the crime, then the picture
moves forward. You need to be prepared for: ‘This spot is a sign of future dangerousness,’ when someone is up for parole. They have a scan, the spot is there, so
they don’t get out. It’s carved in your brain.’’
Other scholars see little wrong with using brain scans to predict violent tendencies and sexual predilections — as long as the scans are used within limits. ‘‘It’s
not necessarily the case that, if predictions work, you would say take that guy off the
street and throw away the key,’’ says Hank Greely, the Stanford law professor. ‘‘You
could require counseling, surveillance, G.P.S. transmitters, or warning the neighbors. None of these are necessarily benign, but they beat the heck out of preventative detention.’’ Greely has little doubt that predictive technologies will be
enlisted in the war on terror — perhaps in radical ways. ‘‘Even with today’s knowledge, I think we can tell whether someone has a strong emotional reaction to
seeing things, and I can certainly imagine a friend-versus-foe scanner. If you put
everyone who reacts badly to an American flag in a concentration camp or Guantánamo, that would be bad, but, in an occupation situation, to mark someone
down for further surveillance, that might be appropriate.’’
Paul Root Wolpe, who teaches social psychiatry and psychiatric ethics at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, says he anticipates that neuroscience predictions will move beyond the courtroom and will be used to make predictions about citizens in all walks of life. ‘‘Will we use brain imaging to track kids
in school because we’ve discovered that certain brain function or morphology
suggests aptitude?’’ he asks. ‘‘I work for NASA, and imagine how helpful it
might be for NASA if it could scan your brain to discover whether you have a
good enough spatial sense to be a pilot.’’ Wolpe says that brain imaging might
eventually be used to decide if someone is a worthy foster or adoptive parent — a
history of major depression and cocaine abuse can leave telltale signs on the brain,
for example, and future studies might find parts of the brain that correspond to
nurturing and caring.
The idea of holding people accountable for their predispositions rather than
their actions poses a challenge to one of the central principles of Anglo-American
jurisprudence: namely, that people are responsible for their behavior, not their
proclivities — for what they do, not what they think. ‘‘We’re going to have to
make a decision about the skull as a privacy domain,’’ Wolpe says. Indeed,
Wolpe serves on the board of an organization called the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, a group of neuroscientists, legal scholars, and privacy advocates
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‘‘dedicated to protecting and advancing freedom of thought in the modern world
of accelerating neurotechnologies.’’
There may be similar ‘‘cognitive liberty’’ battles over efforts to repair or
enhance broken brains. A remarkable technique called transcranial magnetic stimulation, for example, has been used to stimulate or inhibit specific regions of the
brain. It can temporarily alter how we think and feel. Using T.M.S., Ernst Fehr and
Daria Knoch of the University of Zurich temporarily disrupted each side of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in test subjects. They asked their subjects to participate in an experiment that economists call the ultimatum game. One person is
given $20 and told to divide it with a partner. If the partner rejects the proposed
amount as too low, neither person gets any money. Subjects whose prefrontal cortexes were functioning properly tended to reject offers of $4 or less: they would
rather get no money than accept an offer that struck them as insulting and unfair.
But subjects whose right prefrontal cortexes were suppressed by T.M.S. tended to
accept the $4 offer. Although the offer still struck them as insulting, they were able
to suppress their indignation and to pursue the selfishly rational conclusion that a
low offer is better than nothing.
Some neuroscientists believe that T.M.S. may be used in the future to enforce a
vision of therapeutic justice, based on the idea that defective brains can be cured.
‘‘Maybe somewhere down the line, a badly damaged brain would be viewed as
something that can heal, like a broken leg that needs to be repaired,’’ the neurobiologist Robert Sapolsky says, although he acknowledges that defining what
counts as a normal brain is politically and scientifically fraught. Indeed, efforts
to identify normal and abnormal brains have been responsible for some of the
darkest movements in the history of science and technology, from phrenology
to eugenics. ‘‘How far are we willing to go to use neurotechnology to change people’s brains we consider disordered?’’ Wolpe asks. ‘‘We might find a part of the
brain that seems to be malfunctioning, like a discrete part of the brain operative in
violent or sexually predatory behavior, and then turn off or inhibit that behavior
using transcranial magnetic stimulation.’’ Even behaviors in the normal range
might be fine-tuned by T.M.S.: jurors, for example, could be made more emotional
or more deliberative with magnetic interventions. Mark George, an adviser to the
Cephos company and director of the Medical University of South Carolina Center
for Advanced Imaging Research, has submitted a patent application for a T.M.S.
procedure that supposedly suppresses the area of the brain involved in lying and
makes a person less capable of not telling the truth.
As the new technologies proliferate, even the neurolaw experts themselves
have only begun to think about the questions that lie ahead. Can the police get
a search warrant for someone’s brain? Should the Fourth Amendment protect our
minds in the same way that it protects our houses? Can courts order tests of suspects’ memories to determine whether they are gang members or police informers, or would this violate the Fifth Amendment’s ban on compulsory selfincrimination? Would punishing people for their thoughts rather than for their
actions violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment?
However astonishing our machines may become, they cannot tell us how to answer
these perplexing questions. We must instead look to our own powers of reasoning
and intuition, relatively primitive as they may be. As Stephen Morse puts it, neuroscience itself can never identify the mysterious point at which people should be
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excused from responsibility for their actions because they are not able, in some
sense, to control themselves. That question, he suggests, is ‘‘moral and ultimately
legal,’’ and it must be answered not in laboratories but in courtrooms and legislatures. In other words, we must answer it ourselves.

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. React to this Letter to the Editor, which was sent in response to the article above
(April 1, 2007). The author states that The Brain on the Stand reminds us ‘‘that a
form of phrenology is alive and well in the 21st century. . . . Let’s get away from
looking for easy answers and bumps on (or inside) the head to explain why we act
as we do. The world, and we, are much more complex than that.’’
2. Many of the experts interviewed for the Rosen article suggest, either explicitly or
implicitly, that we are nothing more than our brains. But many see things differently. Consider philosopher Tyler Burge’s argument: ‘‘Individuals see, know,
and want to make love. Brains don’t. Those things are psychological — not, in
any evident way, neural.’’ Tyler Burge, A Real Science of Mind, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19,
2010). In what ways do you agree or disagree?
3. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy is one of the many judges who have
criticized sentencing practices in the United States for being too severe. For
instance, sentences in the U.S. are eight times longer on average than those in
Europe, contributing to a much higher rate of incarceration. Editorial, Justice
Kennedy on Prisons, N.Y. Times (Feb. 16, 2010). Based on what you’ve read in
this article, what do you see as the potential implications of neuroscience for
sentencing and incarceration practices, and why?
4. In 2009, Dr. Martha Farah, a cognitive neuroscientist at the University of Pennsylvania, observed that ‘‘neuroscience is giving us increasingly powerful methods
for understanding, predicting, and manipulating behavior. Every sphere of life in
which the human mind plays a central role will be touched by these advances.’’
Univ. Pennsylvania Press Release (Aug. 14, 2009). Neuroscientist Joshua Greene
and psychologist Jonathan Cohen have similarly argued that ‘‘cognitive neuroscience, by identifying the specific mechanisms responsible for behavior, will
vividly illustrate what until now could only be appreciated through esoteric theorizing: that there is something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human
action and responsibility, and that, as a result, the legal principles we have devised
to reflect these conceptions may be flawed.’’ Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For
the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B. 1775 (2004). What pronouncements, if any, would you make about the implications if neuroscience?
5. United States District Court Judge Jed Rakoff has observed that ‘‘as neuroscience
enters the courtroom . . . [there is a] growing perception among judges that [it]
has the potential to be of great service, and challenge, to a great many aspects of
the law.’’ In what ways do you think might neuroscience be of service? And when
and how might it pose significant challenges to judges? Judge Rakoff has also
observed that the law ‘‘has struggled both to define relevant states of mind
and to devise ways of perceiving them.’’ Can neuroscience help law in defining
and perceiving mental states? Why or why not? The SAGE Center for the Study of
the Mind, A Judge’s Guide to Neuroscience: A Concise Introduction 1, 1 (2010).
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6. In addition to neuroscience researchers and treating clinicians, criminologists
are also making use of neuroscience and behavioral genetics. The field of ‘‘biosocial criminology,’’ which like neurolaw is only now emerging, seeks to integrate
knowledge from the biological sciences (including genetics, evolutionary psychology, and the neurosciences) into criminology. The goal is a greater
understanding of criminal behavior. See Biosocial Criminology: New Directions in
Theory and Research, (Anthony Walsh & Kevin M. Beaver eds., 2009). How
might findings from biosocial criminology be relevant to the criminal justice
system?
7. In his 2013 book The Anatomy of Violence, neurocriminologist Adrian Raine suggests that neuroscience may one day allow society to preemptively intervene into
the lives (and brains) of would-be criminals. Raine asks his readers to imagine
that in 2034 the government launches the LOMBROSO program, ‘‘Legal Offensive on Murder: Brain Research Operation for the Screening of Offenders.’’
Under this program, every adult male must have a brain scan and submit a
DNA sample to the government. Using this data and algorithms that are
improved over time, some of these males are labeled as ‘‘Lombroso Positive’’
(LP). The LPs are held in a detention center (though they do have an opportunity to legally challenge the findings). LPs are retested each year, and can
become eligible for release back into the community. Raine further imagines,
in 2040, the creation of a National Child Screening Program (NCSP), which
would apply to all children ten years and above. The picture Raine paints is,
of course, purely speculative at this point. But Raine argues that this is a realistic,
and indeed likely a desirable, future. Do you agree?
8. Lie detection, the subject of a later chapter in this book, has been a focus of much
neurolaw research. A 2001 editorial in Nature Neuroscience suggested that questions about the efficacy of neuroscience-based lie detection can ‘‘only be resolved
by extensive field-testing. This seems desirable; although EEG testing may raise
the specter of ‘Big Brother’ in the public imagination, it is in reality just another
tool for determining the facts, no different in principle from handwriting, fiber,
or DNA evidence. Moreover, its use by prosecutors, at least in the U.S., would be
governed by the constitutional protection against self-incrimination, and its main
application in the courts would probably be to argue for innocence rather than
guilt.’’ Forensic Neuroscience on Trial, 4 Nature Neuroscience 1, 1 (2001). Do you
agree that neuroscientific evidence is no different than handwriting, fiber, or
DNA evidence? Or is neuroscience categorically different?

C. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
Stacey Tovino

Functional Neuroimaging and the Law:
Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship
7 Am. J. of Bioethics 44 (2007)

. . . PROPERTY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Property may not be the first area of the law that comes to mind when thinking
about advances in functional neuroimaging, but recent scholarship suggests
several interesting applications.
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One traditional view of property is its dependency on the law for its existence.
Jeremy Bentham in 1802 stated: ‘‘[T]here is no such thing as natural property; it is
entirely the creature of the law. . . . Property and law were born together, and
would die together. Before the laws property did not exist; take away the law
and property will be no more.’’ In recent scholarship, Jeffrey Evans Stake proposes
an alternative possibility, which is that fundamental principles of property preceded formal institutions and might be encoded in the human brain.
One common law property concept is ‘‘first in time, first in right,’’ which is the
notion that the first individual to possess a thing owns it. A second property concept involves possession, which is said to require both physical control and intent
to assert control. A third concept is adverse possession, which involves the reallocation of legal title from the record title holder to the current possessor without
the consent of the record title holder.
One question is whether neuroscience in general, or neuroimaging in
particular, can or could provide insight into these and other property rules. Are
fundamental principles of property encoded in the human brain? Can or could
functional neuroimaging reveal the neural correlates of behaviors that follow from
these principles? If so, is the property instinct nothing more than a natural inclination to learn the rules that other humans used to resolve coordination problems
inherent in resource disputes? Or is the ability to recognize and adhere to specific
conventions part of our behavioral repertoire? Do we have a natural feeling that we
can transfer things to other people? What about a natural instinct of how to transfer or dispose of property? Can the recognition of a deep property structure, akin
to a deep language structure, assist in understanding the rules of property and
applying them to new situations?
Moving beyond traditional property law, scholars have identified several
intellectual-property implications of advances in functional neuroimaging. For
example, can the first person to make a particular use of functional-neuroimaging
technology patent that use even without owning a patent on the MRI machine
itself? Can a person patent a particular blood-oxygenation-level-dependent
(BOLD) signal based on the claim that the BOLD response could be used to diagnose or predict a particular physical or mental health condition, behavior, preference, or characteristic? Or is there no ‘‘composition of matter’’— no structure or
molecule in BOLD activity — that can be patented? . . .
Moving from patent to copyright issues, recent studies suggest that creative
thoughts may result not from a startling breakthrough of new thought but, instead,
from the reworking of preexisting ideas and facts as part of a new strange attractor
within the brain (or, even, chance, noise, or an error within the brain). The
copyright question becomes whether the copyright requirement for ‘‘creativity,’’
or a ‘‘creative spark,’’ within the expressive elements of a work are valid given what
science may show about how creative thought actually occurs. If not, should we
adopt a new test for determining whether there is sufficient evidence of creativity
in a work to grant a copyright?
TORT LAW
Torts are civil wrongs committed against persons or property other than
breach of contract. Given that pain and suffering damages can account for a
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significant portion of personal damage awards in tort cases, the ability to prove or
measure pain and suffering (or the lack thereof) could be invaluable. In the past
decade, several groups of scientists have used functional-neuroimaging technology
in an attempt to better understand the neural correlates of physical pain. In some
of these studies, scientists have found significantly greater activations in certain
areas of the brain when subjects are exposed to painful stimuli, as well as a correlation between the amount of brain activation and the intensity of the painful
stimulus.
In response to these findings, at least one scholar has begun to explore the
role functional neuroimaging may play in the legal evaluation of physical pain.
Two threshold questions are whether plaintiffs will attempt to use neuroimaging
technology to bolster their tort claims if they otherwise lack proof of their physical
pain and suffering, and whether defendants will attempt to use the technology to
impugn the claims of those who may be exaggerating their physical pain and
suffering. If so, will functional neuroimaging provide increasingly objective methods of assessing the severity of an individual’s pain? Stated another way, will functional neuroimaging continue to move us away from a first-person narrative
approach to pain complaints and proof of pain, and towards more objective methods of pain proof in torts cases? Or, will functional neuroimaging be subject to the
same subjective limitations as patients’ verbal expressions of pain?
In addition to studies of the brain activations of individuals who are exposed to
physically painful stimuli, such as burn pain, other studies are focusing on the
neural correlates of emotional pain. These studies have prompted at least one
scholar to examine the role functional neuroimaging may play in the evaluation
of particular torts that are based on emotional pain, such as negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Not recognized at common law and still distrusted by many
courts, this tort has an objective element (would the situation distress a reasonable
person?) and a subjective element (did the situation actually distress the particular
claimant?). Critics of the tort worry that some claimants can feign their emotional
distress and that courts will not be able to quantify the distress of those claimants
who truly are distressed.
One legal question is whether neuroimaging might be able to contribute to
either the objective or subjective elements of a plaintiff’s negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim. If so, will the likely absence of a baseline — a scan taken
of the plaintiff’s brain prior to the traumatic event — be fatal to the plaintiff’s
claim? If neuroscientific evidence is accepted as tangible proof of a plaintiff’s
otherwise intangible distress, will that end the courts’ distrust of the tort? Or
will courts find another reason to be skeptical of negligent infliction of emotional
distress?
To turn the tables, what if a tort claimant fails to introduce potentially relevant
functional neuroimaging evidence? Could such a failure be fatal to her tort claim?
In In re Aircrash at Little Rock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit suggested that the plaintiff’s medical expert should have ordered a positron emission tomography or single photon emission computed tomography scan
of the plaintiff’s brain to succeed in his argument that the plaintiff’s post-traumatic
stress disorder caused physical injury to her brain: ‘‘[The plaintiff] was not given a
magnetic resonance spectroscopy, a positron emission tomography (PET) scan or
a single positron [sic] emission computed tomography (SPECT) scan, all tests
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which . . . could have been utilized to show the functioning of [her] brain’’ (2002,
507, 511).
TRUTH IN ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER LAW
The association between attempted deception and BOLD signal in the
executive brain regions, as well as the potential uses of these findings in
commercial and forensic practice, has received significant attention in both the
scientific and popular literature. Early speculation that fMRI could be used as a
commercial lie detector proved not so speculative last year, when one organization
began using the Internet to market its fMRI lie detection and other services
directly to individuals, employers, corporations, lawyers, investors, and federal,
state, and international governments, and a second organization stated a more
cautious intention to offer its commercial fMRI services as soon as its product
meets its own internally established scientific standards.
The extent to which individuals and organizations actually purchase these
commercial brain-scanning services is unknown. However, a continuing issue is
whether these brain scans provide valuable information that could assist with
personal and organizational decision-making, or whether the offering of these
tests is premature and misleading to the public. Restated as a legal question,
the issue is whether the web materials of the organization that is currently offering
these services are truthful, fair, non-deceptive, and non-misleading, and whether
they have evidence backing their claims, as is required by laws such as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, state deceptive-and-unlawful-trade-practices acts, state
false-statement-in-advertising acts, and state prevention-of-consumer-fraud
acts. . . .
One company currently offering fMRI services to the public states on its website that fMRI is the ‘‘first and only direct measurement of truth verification and lie
detection in human history.’’ This statement presumably is meant to distinguish
polygraph, which measures a response of the peripheral nervous system, from
fMRI, which involves the central nervous system. But is it fair to state that fMRI
is a direct measurement of truth verification given that fMRI uses BOLD signal as a
proxy for neuronal activity and usually is referred to as an indirect measure of
neuronal activity? Or is it good enough that BOLD signal has been found to be
a ‘‘close approximation,’’ or a ‘‘faithful signal,’’ of neuronal activity? Or would
these descriptions be considered non-material because they likely would not affect
a reasonable consumer’s decision to purchase an fMRI test? Or does the complexity of the science behind fMRI give these companies some legal grace in describing
their tests to the public?
One company states that its fMRI tests are ‘‘fully automated’’ and ‘‘[o]bserver
independent (objective)’’ (No Lie MRI 2006b). The catch here is that the concept
of objective fMRI testing runs counter to the subjective traits attributed to fMRI in
the popular literature. In the past two years, observers have referred to fMRI as an
‘‘interpretive practice,’’ noting that, ‘‘Sometimes, the difference between seeing
higher activity in the parietal lobe compared to the occipital lobe is akin to deciding whether Van Gogh or Matisse is the more colorful artist’’ (Jaffee 2004, 64) and
that, ‘‘What constitutes a ‘significantly greater’ activation is, in a way, in the eye of
the beholder’’ (Donaldson 2004, 442). So is fMRI testing an objective or subjective
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activity, or is it both? Does it depend on how the fMRI test is designed? To clarify
the legal question, is it truthful, fair, non-deceptive, and non-misleading to state
that an fMRI test is objective and fully automated? Or does the complexity of fMRI
again require legal grace?
One company’s web materials state that fMRI has ‘‘potential applications to a
wide variety of concerns held by individual citizens [including] risk reduction in
dating[, t]rust issues in interpersonal relationships[, and] issues concerning the
underlying topics of sex, power, and money’’ (No Lie MRI 2006c). Employers are
informed that fMRI testing ‘‘could potentially substitute for drug screenings,
resume validation, and security background checks. Not only would this significantly streamline and speed up the hiring process, it would also reduce the
costs associated with hiring a new employee. It would be expected to result in a
more honest employee base’’ (No Lie MRI 2006b). Insurance companies are
informed that fMRI ‘‘truth verification could significantly diminish insurance
fraud and result [ . . .] in lowering of premiums for their clients’’ (No Lie MRI
2006b). Governments are informed that ‘‘accurate lie detection would be of tremendous benefit for rooting out corrupt individuals’’ (No Lie MRI 2006f). The
accuracy of fMRI testing also is featured prominently in these web materials.
According to one representation, ‘‘Current accuracy is over 90% and is estimated
to be 99% once product development is complete’’ (No Lie MRI 2006d). The
company links to a host of scientific studies that appear to back its claims (No
Lie MRI 2006e).
So is fMRI really capable of these claims? If the answer is ‘‘not right now,’’ do
the words ‘‘potential,’’ ‘‘potentially,’’ and ‘‘could’’ in the previous quotations sufficiently qualify them? Given that ‘‘[i]maging is at present very expensive and
requires carefully chosen and cooperative subjects’’ (Morse 2006a, 403), is it truthful, fair, non-misleading, and non-deceptive to state that fMRI could be used in the
dating, employment, insurance, and criminal contexts — contexts in which subjects may have an incentive not to carry out the assigned mental tasks? Or are
these companies harmless victims of ‘‘brain overclaim syndrome,’’ a newly diagnosed syndrome characterized by making claims about the implications of neuroscience that cannot be conceptually or empirically sustained? Straying
momentarily from the legal to the normative, what about the urgency with
which other scientists have spoken out about not putting fMRI to social,
commercial, and criminal use?
HEALTH LAW: CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY
. . . The confidentiality and privacy issues raised by advances in functional neuroimaging were recognized early and are discussed often. These authors almost
uniformly agree that the ability of functional neuroimaging to reveal the neural
correlates of conditions, behaviors, preferences, and characteristics, some or all of
which individuals may prefer to keep secret, ‘‘threatens to invade a last inviolate
area of ‘self’’’ (Greely 2006c, 253). These concerns have, not surprisingly, been
coined ‘‘neuroprivacy.’’
In examining the confidentiality and privacy issues raised by fMRI, the literature has carefully applied the health-information-confidentiality protections within
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy
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Rule, the federal Common Rule, Public Health Service provisions establishing certificates of confidentiality, state statutes and regulations, and the common law privacy torts (intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation) to a variety of
possible uses and disclosures of fMRI scans and neuroimaging data, including
the disclosure of raw neuroimaging data to neuroimaging databanks. The literature also has identified how certain uses and disclosures of functional neuroimaging information may fall within statutory, regulatory, and common law exceptions
to the duty of confidentiality. These exceptions relate to uses and disclosures of
functional neuroimaging information for activities required by law, public health
activities, health oversight activities, judicial and administrative proceedings, law
enforcement activities, research activities, situations involving serious threats to
health and safety, national security and intelligence activities, and other specialized
government functions. The literature suggests that there are gaps in confidentiality
protections for functional-neuroimaging information and privacy protections for
individuals whose brains are scanned. . . .
The million-dollar question identified in this literature is whether functional
neuroimaging information requires special, or heightened, confidentiality and privacy protections. The idea that HIV and AIDS test results and genetic information
require special, or heightened, confidentiality and privacy protections has been
known as ‘‘HIV exceptionalism’’ and ‘‘genetic exceptionalism,’’ respectively.
The question thus becomes whether a third generation of exceptionalism —
‘‘neuro[-]exceptionalism’’— should be implemented. Some have suggested that
the answer is ‘‘yes.’’
In examining this question, the literature has evaluated the reasons both for
and against exceptional confidentiality and privacy provisions. These include the
existence of special or heightened confidentiality protections for other types of
sensitive information, including alcohol- and drug-abuse treatment records, psychotherapy notes, mental-health records, HIV and AIDS test results, and genetic
information; the existence of state genetic-discrimination legislation in health
insurance, employment, and life insurance; the existence of ethical provisions
addressing the disclosure of genetic information to insurers and law-enforcement
agencies; the possible predictive value of some functional-neuroimaging information; the sensitive and potentially stigmatizing nature of some functional-neuroimaging information; the fact that functional-neuroimaging information may not
now (although it could in the future) carry a stigma like genetic information; the
fact that the public may not now (although it could in the future) regard functional-neuroimaging information as unique; and the fact that brain scans, unlike
genetic information, may be able to be separated from the rest of the medical or
study record with relative ease. The literature suggests that some, but not all, of the
reasons given for HIV and genetic exceptionalism apply in the context of functional neuroimaging. The literature also suggests, however, that some, but not all,
of the criticisms of HIV and genetic exceptionalism also apply in the context of
functional neuroimaging.
To refine the legal question, should a federal or state legislature or administrative agency adopt neuro-exceptional confidentiality provisions, defined as provisions that would make it more difficult for folks like physicians and scientists to use
and disclose functional-neuroimaging information compared to other health
information? Or should a federal or state legislature or administrative agency
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adopt neuro-exceptional privacy provisions, defined as provisions that would make
it more difficult for organizations such as employers and insurers to obtain neuroimaging information about an individual for use in underwriting and employment decision-making? If so, how would we define the neuroimaging information
that would receive special protection? Would it include just the brain scans? Or do
we need to protect the related interpretation and reports too? And what types of
neuroimages would be protected? Just fMRI scans? What about positron emission
tomography scans and single-photon emission computed tomography scans?
Or should a federal or state legislature or administrative agency adopt generic
(non-neuro-exceptional) privacy provisions, defined as provisions that would make
it more difficult for organizations such as employers and insurers to obtain or use
any type of health information, including functional-neuroimaging information,
about an individual for particular purposes, whether it be non-job-related purposes, job-related purposes, underwriting and enrollment purposes, etc. Along
these lines, a law professor and a scientist have already jointly proposed that the
federal government (or, barring the federal government, the state governments)
should ban any non-research use of new methods of lie detection, including fMRIbased lie detection, unless or until the new method has been proven safe and
effective to the satisfaction of a regulatory agency and has been vetted through
the peer-reviewed scientific literature.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
There has been considerable speculation that employers will want to use fMRI
to probe the minds of job applicants and current employees to determine whether
to hire or maintain them. Given that one company currently is marketing its brainscanning services directly to employers, the legal question becomes whether fMRI
violates applicants’ and employees’ interest in avoiding unwanted neurological
intrusions or whether employers are permitted to obtain functional-neuroimaging
information about their applicants and employees.
One potential source of privacy rights for employees and job applicants is Title
I of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). As one way of preventing
disability discrimination, Title I regulates covered employers’ use of qualification
standards, employment tests, and other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out individuals with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities. One specific
legal question is whether functional neuroimaging has the potential to identify a
disability, thus enabling an employer to screen out an individual based on that
disability.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations interpreting Title I define disability to include physical and mental impairments, including
neurological disorders, mental illnesses, and specific learning disabilities, that substantially limit one or more major life activities of an individual. . . . So does that
mean that the ADA’s screening provisions would regulate a covered employer’s use
of fMRI test results in an attempt to screen out individuals who have depression,
schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder if such conditions substantially limit a major life
activity of the individuals tested? Would the screening provisions not regulate
employer attempts to screen out individuals based on fMRI ‘‘findings’’ of
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pedophilia, compulsive gambling, or homosexuality because these qualities do not
constitute impairments or disabilities?
. . . The question becomes how the ADA’s rules regarding medical examinations (which differ at the preemployment, preplacement, and employment stages)
will regulate an employer’s use of a particular fMRI test. The answer appears to
hinge on the evidence the test will provide. But can an fMRI test designed to elicit
evidence of honesty or deception also elicit evidence of a mental disorder such as
schizophrenia and pedophilia? If so, would the test be a medical examination or
not?
Another employment issue addressed in the literature is whether the use of
fMRI as a lie detector would be regulated by the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act (EPPA). The EPPA prohibits some, but not all, employers from requiring
employees to submit to lie-detector tests, defined to include polygraphs, deceptographs, voice stress analyzers, psychological stress evaluators, and ‘‘any other similar device . . . that is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of
rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an
individual’’ (29 U.S.C. §§ 2002(1), 2001(3)). The specific legal question is whether
fMRI is a device that is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of
rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an
individual. The early answer from the law literature seems to want to be ‘‘yes,’’
although one company that offers fMRI services to employers would not agree:
‘‘U.S. law prohibits truth-verification/lie-detection testing for employees that is
based on measuring the autonomic nervous system (e.g. polygraph testing). No
Lie MRI measures the central nervous system directly and such is not subject to
restriction by these laws’’ (No Lie MRI 2006b).
FIRST AMENDMENT
The United States Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) reportedly have invested millions of dollars in neuroimaging technologies
that might be used in law enforcement and intelligence, with a particular emphasis
on brain scans that might be used to identify terrorists. The Pentagon’s Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (Arlington, VA) reportedly has
funded research at Lockheed Martin (Bethesda, MD) and Rutgers University
(Camden, NJ) relating to ‘‘remote brain prints’’ as well as research by an Oregon
organization relating to the creation of brain sensors that would detect, transmit,
and reconstruct certain brain signals. A broad legal question suggested by these
developments is how the United States Constitution and analogous state provisions
might constrain a government actor’s use of fMRI to probe an individual’s brain.
More specific legal questions can be analyzed under the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments.
Perhaps best known for its express rights of freedom of speech and press, the
First Amendment also protects other, lesser-known but related interests, such as
the interest of political groups and social organizations in holding physically
private meetings and in maintaining the privacy of their membership lists, as
well as the interest of individuals in reading books and watching movies in their
own homes, regardless of the content of such books or films. These protections
stem from the Supreme Court’s recognition that the First Amendment protects
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‘‘freedom of thought and solitude in the home’’ or, more generally, ‘‘privacy of
thought.’’ In Stanley v. Georgia, its seminal ‘‘privacy of thought’’ case, the Supreme
Court stated that ‘‘also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy’’
(Glenn 2006, 61). . . .
. . . [A] specific legal question for those with First Amendment expertise is
whether individuals who may in the future be required, ordered, or requested
by a government actor to submit to fMRI to detect a particular condition, thought
pattern, behavior, preference, or characteristic successfully could invoke the concept of ‘‘privacy of thought’’ as a ground for refusing to submit to the fMRI. Or do
the ‘‘privacy of thought’’ principles announced in these Supreme Court cases only
apply to prohibit governmental interference with activities such as closed meetings, book reading, and movie watching within the home, and homosexual activity?
Does it matter that the government may only be imaging, but not interfering, with
such thoughts? Would the answer change if the government attempted to intervene, change, or penalize such thoughts? The literature frames these questions
more broadly as ‘‘cognitive privacy,’’ ‘‘cognitive liberty,’’ and sometimes ‘‘cognitive
freedom’’ questions.
FIFTH AMENDMENT
. . . The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a
person from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against herself.
The Fifth Amendment’s privilege — better known as the privilege against selfincrimination — has been broadly interpreted to protect criminal suspects and
defendants from having to take the stand or testify in grand-jury proceedings
and criminal trials. . . .
A specific question for those with expertise in criminal procedure is whether
the Fifth Amendment might prohibit government-imposed fMRI scans of criminal
suspects and defendants if the scans are interpreted to reveal incriminating
evidence. Stated another way, does the right to remain silent, or the right not
to speak, also include the right not to reveal one’s incriminating conditions,
thoughts, and behaviors through fMRI? At first glance, Miranda’s broad ‘‘all settings’’ language (‘‘there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment . . . serves to
protect persons in all settings . . . from being compelled to incriminate themselves’’ [467]), as well as similarly broad language in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette (‘‘The right of freedom of thought and of religion as
guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all . . .’’ [645]), would
seem to support an affirmative answer to this question (Glenn 2005, 61).
But a follow-up question is whether the results of some functional neuroimaging examinations will survive the Schmerber v. California ‘‘testimonial or communicative evidence’’ limitation on the Fifth Amendment. . . .
To fine-tune the legal issue, the question is whether fMRI is more like
testimonial and communicative evidence (and evidence elicited from lie-detector
tests), or is a better analogy to blood tests, urinalysis testing, mental examinations,
stomach radiographs, fingerprints, or neutron-activation tests? Will the answer
depend on the fMRI test and the information the test is designed to elicit? For
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example, if a government actor uses fMRI in an attempt to detect the deception of
a criminal suspect, would the evidence be considered ‘‘testimonial or communicative’’ evidence in accordance with the Schmerber majority clarification relating to
lie detector tests? Likewise, if a government actor uses fMRI in an attempt to detect
a mental-health condition or disorder such as Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia,
or pedophilia, would the fMRI evidence be considered ‘‘real or physical’’ evidence
not protected by the Fifth Amendment?
Or is the testimonial-versus-communicative evidence approach to functional
neuroimaging all wrong? Perhaps a better approach is to apply the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s ‘‘shocks the conscience test,’’ pursuant to which a
government action is a violation of substantive due process if it shocks the conscience. Stated another way, is a government-imposed fMRI that involuntarily
extracts information from unwilling subjects contrary to the common law tradition
and the fundamental concerns of Western polities, in part because it comes closer
to mind reading than any other modern technology?
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment implications of functional neuroimaging have been
introduced in the literature. These issues can be phrased in terms of whether the
Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s interest in maintaining the privacy of
her thoughts, or whether the government can ‘‘search and seize’’ those thoughts.
Stated another way, when can an individual succeed in arguing that a governmentordered fMRI scan must be excluded from evidence as the product of an unlawful
search and seizure?
An initial legal question is, of course, whether a functional brain scan constitutes a search of the person, thus implicating the Fourth Amendment. The initial
literature seems to want to answer this question in the affirmative. Does the answer
depend on the fMRI test or the information the test is designed to elicit? Or would
all government-ordered functional-neuroimaging tests constitute searches?
A second question relates to how the Fourth Amendment would regulate the
imposition of any functional brain scans that are determined to be searches. . . .
In determining whether brain-scanning procedures followed by the government respect relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness, what factors would the courts consider? Does one factor relate to whether the test chosen is
reasonable in terms of safety and efficacy? . . .
The Supreme Court also has found that blood tests are ‘‘commonplace in
these days of periodic physical examination and experience with them teaches
that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain’’ (Schmerber 1966, 771). Other
cases have found, however, that it is not reasonable to remove a bullet lodged
one-inch deep in an individual’s chest. Functional MRI currently is not as
commonplace as blood tests. But is it as uncommon or as unreasonable as removing a bullet that was taken in the chest? Is fMRI more or less uncomfortable than a
needle prick? What about scans ordered for individuals who fear loud noises or
claustrophobic situations? Does the fact that fMRI usually is considered minimal
risk in the context of biomedical research favor a government’s interest in imposing an fMRI? . . .
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In determining the constitutionality of a brain scan, how would the courts
weigh the subjects’ expectations of privacy? In the public school context, for
example, the Supreme Court has held that grade K-12 students have a somewhat
lowered expectation of privacy because school authorities act in loco parentis and
need to control the student body in order for the educational mission to be implemented. School districts thus have been permitted to require all student athletes to
submit to urinalysis drug testing as a condition of participation in interscholastic
sports, provided that the testing was conducted in a relatively unobtrusive manner.
Of the individuals on whom it is speculated that the government might impose
brain scans (executive branch leaders, employees, criminal suspects, etc.), which
have lowered expectations of privacy? And would fMRI be considered ‘‘relatively
unobtrusive’’?
Finally, how would the courts weigh the government’s interest in obtaining
information through a functional-neuroimaging test? For example, courts have
given sufficient weight to a government’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. Would a court weigh more heavily a government’s interest
in determining whether a particular individual committed murder compared to
whether a particular individual can get along with others in the workplace? Or will
fMRI never be capable of ‘‘fairly and accurately’’ determining guilt or innocence
or social cooperation?
Nita Farahany

The Government Is Trying to Wrap Its Mind Around Yours
Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 2008

Imagine a world of streets lined with video cameras that alert authorities to any
suspicious activity. A world where police officers can read the minds of potential
criminals and arrest them before they commit any crimes. A world in which a
suspect who lies under questioning gets nabbed immediately because his brain
has given him away.
Though that may sound a lot like the plot of the 2002 movie ‘‘Minority
Report,’’ starring Tom Cruise and based on a Philip K. Dick novel, I’m not talking
about science fiction here; it turns out we’re not so far away from that world. But
does it sound like a very safe place, or a very scary one?
It’s a question I think we should be asking as the federal government invests
millions of dollars in emerging technology aimed at detecting and decoding brain
activity. And though government funding focuses on military uses for these new
gizmos, they can and do end up in the hands of civilian law enforcement and in
commercial applications. As spending continues and neurotechnology advances,
that imagined world is no longer the stuff of science fiction or futuristic movies,
and we postpone at our peril confronting the ethical and legal dilemmas it poses
for a society that values not just personal safety but civil liberty as well.
Consider Cernium Corp.’s ‘‘Perceptrak’’ video surveillance and monitoring
system, recently installed by Johns Hopkins University, among others. This technology grew out of a project funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency — the central research-and-development organization for the Department
of Defense — to develop intelligent video-analytics systems. Unlike simple video
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cameras monitored by security guards, Perceptrak integrates video cameras with an
intelligent computer video. It uses algorithms to analyze streaming video and
detect suspicious activities, such as people loitering in a secure area, a group converging, or someone leaving a package unattended. Since installing Perceptrak,
Johns Hopkins has reported a 25 percent reduction in crime.
But that’s only the beginning. Police may soon be able to monitor suspicious
brain activity from a distance as well. New neurotechnology soon may be able to
detect a person who is particularly nervous, in possession of guilty knowledge, or,
in the more distant future, to detect a person thinking, ‘‘Only one hour until the
bomb explodes.’’ Today, the science of detecting and decoding brain activity is in
its infancy. But various government agencies are funding the development of technology to detect brain activity remotely and are hoping to eventually decode what
someone is thinking. Scientists, however, wildly disagree about the accuracy of
brain imaging technology, what brain activity may mean and especially whether
brain activity can be detected from afar.
Yet as the experts argue about the scientific limitations of remote brain detection, this chilling science fiction may already be a reality. In 2002, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center reported that NASA was developing brain-monitoring
devices for airports and was seeking to use noninvasive sensors in passenger gates
to collect the electronic signals emitted by passengers’ brains. Scientists scoffed at
the reports, arguing that to do what NASA was proposing required that an electroencephalogram (EEG) be physically attached to the scalp.
But that same year, scientists at the University of Sussex in England adapted
the same technology they had been using to detect heart rates at distances of up to
one meter, or a little more than three feet, to remotely detect changes in the brain.
And while scientific limitations to remote EEG detection still exist, clearly the
question is when, not if, these issues will be resolved.
Meanwhile, another remote brain-activity detector, which uses light beamed
through the skull to measure changes in oxygen levels in the brain, may be on the
way. Together with the EEG, it would enhance the power of brain scanning. Today
the technology consists of a headband sensor worn by the subject, a control box to
capture the data, and a computer to analyze it. With the help of government funding, however, that is all becoming increasingly compact and portable, paving the
way for more specific remote detection of brain activity. But don’t panic: The government can’t read our minds — yet. So far, these tools simply measure changes in
the brain; they don’t detect thoughts and intentions.
Scientists, though, are hard at work trying to decode how those signals relate to
mental states such as perception and intention. Different EEG frequencies, for
example, have been associated with fear, anger, joy, and sorrow and different cognitive states such as a person’s level of alertness. So when you’re stopped for speeding and terrified because you’re carrying illegal drugs in the trunk of your car, EEG
technology might enable the police to detect your fear or increased alertness. This
is not so far-fetched: Some scientists already are able to tell from brain images in
the lab whether a test subject was envisioning a tool such as a hammer or a screwdriver or a dwelling, and to predict whether the subject intended to add or subtract
numbers. . . .
Although brain-based lie-detection technology has been quite controversial
and has only been tested on a limited basis, early researchers have claimed high
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accuracy at detecting deception. But there’s a problem: Most brain-based liedetection tests assume that lying should result in more brain activity than truthtelling because lying involves more cognition. So these lie-detection methods may
fail in sociopaths or in individuals who believe in the falsehood they’re telling.
Whether such technology will be effective outside the laboratory remains to be
seen, but the very fact that the government is banking on its future potential raises
myriad questions. Imagine, for example, a police officer approaching a suspect
based on Perceptrak’s ‘‘unusual activity’’ detection. Equipped with remote neural-detection technology, the officer asks her a few questions, and the detection
device deems her responses to be deceptive. Will this be enough evidence for an
arrest? Can it be used to convict a person of intent to commit a crime? Significant
scientific hurdles remain before neurotechnology can be used that way, but, given
how fast it’s developing, I think we must pause now to ask how it may affect the
fundamental precepts of our criminal-justice system.
Americans have been willing to tolerate significant new security measures and
greater encroachments on civil liberties after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
Could reports of significant crime reduction such as that seen by Johns Hopkins,
or incidents such as the student shootings last year at Virginia Tech or more
recently at Northern Illinois University, be enough to justify the use of precrime
technology? Could remote neural monitoring together with intelligent video analytics have prevented those tragedies? And if they could, should they be allowed to?
These are just some of the questions we must ask as we balance scientific
advances and the promise of enhanced safety against a loss of liberty. And we
must do it now, while our voices still matter. In a world where private thoughts
are no longer private, what will our protections be?

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. To ask whether ‘‘neuroscience’’ will affect ‘‘law’’ is of course actually to ask
whether specific types of neuroscientific findings will affect specific types of law in
specific kinds of legal contexts. Professor Tovino identifies a number of possible
intersections for law and neuroscience. Before delving deeper into the neuroscience later in this coursebook, take a moment to assess your first impressions.
What specific areas of law are most likely to be affected by neuroscience? How
and why did you identify those areas?
2. As brain science matures, claims about brain health are increasing as well. For
instance, one brand of milk includes the following on their milk cartons: ‘‘Kids’
brains grow incredibly fast. In fact the brain nearly quadruples in the first five
years of life. Up to 20 percent of the human brain is made of DHA, yet most kids
don’t get their recommended DHA from common dietary sources like fish. By
making Horizon Organic Milk Plus DHA your family choice, you’re bringing
home all the goodness of organic plus an extra nutritional boost for growing
minds and bodies.’’ How would you evaluate such a claim? In Barrera v. Dean
Foods (No. 11-CV2249L, filed Sept. 27, 2011), a plaintiff is suing Dean Foods
for false, misleading, and deceitful representations. The plaintiff in the case
argues that clinical cause and effect studies have found no causative link between
DHA algal oil supplementation and brain health.
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3. The selections from Tovino and Farahany suggest that the government may use
brain imaging to ‘‘read minds.’’ What does it mean to read someone’s mind? And
if brain-based mind reading were possible, would you see such uses as more akin
to the government administering a blood test, forcing a confession, or something
else?
4. Headlines such as ‘‘Brain Scanning May Be Used in Security Checks’’ have not
been uncommon in recent years, and a 2012 review found that ‘‘the US national
security establishment has come to see neuroscience as a promising and integral
component of its 21st century needs.’’ Michael N. Tennison & Jonathan D.
Moreno, Neuroscience, Ethics, and National Security: The State of the Art, 10 PLoS
Biology e1001289 (2012). In what ways might neuroscience contribute to governments’ national security efforts?
5. Brain science might also play a role in understanding, administering, and critiquing interrogation techniques. The release of Department of Justice memos
in 2009 detailing coercive interrogation techniques used on terrorist suspects has
raised questions about the underlying science of such techniques. The premise is
simple: continuously inflicting shock, stress, anxiety, disorientation, and lack of
control will induce suspects to reveal reliable information from long-term memory. But, as you will read in the chapter on memory, this is not necessarily the
case. While studies have shown that extreme stress impairs the ability to recall
previously learned information and prior events, mildly stressful events in fact
enhance recall. One neuroscientist suggests that ‘‘[t]he experience of capture,
transport and subsequent challenging questioning would seem to be more than
enough to make suspects reveal information.’’ Shane O’Mara, Torturing the Brain:
On the Folk Psychology and Folk Neurobiology Motivating ‘‘Enhanced and Coercive Interrogation Techniques,’’ 13 Trends in Cognitive Sci. 497, 498 (2009). Can neuroscience help to draw the line between permissible and non-permissible
interrogation techniques? See Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging
in Counterterrorism: A ‘‘No-Brainer’’ or a Human Rights Hazard?, 33 Am J.L. Med.
483 (2007).
6. The readings in this chapter have discussed many new technologies, and many
legal issues they do or might raise. Which issues strike you as the most important
for society and its legal system to grapple with, and why? As an attorney, which
would you find most useful to you, or most threatening to encounter from the
other side, and why?
7. How soon, if ever, will the imagined future of neurolaw arrive? Consider that in
2002 The Economist wrote that, ‘‘Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy,
make society homogeneous and gut the concept of human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these things first.’’ The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your
Mind, The Economist, May 23, 2002. To what extent do you agree? For a contrasting view, see Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw Exuberance: A Plea
for Neuromodesty, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (2011).
8. Neurotheorist David Marr once wrote that ‘‘trying to understand perception by
studying only neurons is like trying to understand bird flight by studying only
feathers: it just cannot be done. In order to understand bird flight, we have to
understand aerodynamics; only then do the structure of feathers and the
different shapes of birds’ wings make sense.’’ David Marr, Vision: A Computational
Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information 27
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(1982). What else might one need to study, other than the brain, in order to
understand human cognition?
9. The importance and promise of neuroscience research was prominently highlighted when President Obama in April, 2013, announced the BRAIN (Brain
Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies) initiative. For
more on that initiative, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/brain-initiative.

FURTHER READING
Law and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues (Michael Freeman ed., 2010).
International Neurolaw: A Comparative Analysis (Tade M. Spranger ed., 2012).
A Primer on Criminal Law and Neuroscience (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds.,
2013).
Henry Greely & Anthony Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in Federal Judicial College
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed., 2012).
Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in International
Neurolaw: A Comparative Analysis 349 (Tade M. Spranger ed., 2012).
Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 Ann. Rev. L.
Soc. Sci. 28.1 (2010).
The SAGE Center for the Study of the Mind, A Judge’s Guide to Neuroscience: A Concise
Introduction (2010).
Handbook on Psychopathy and Law (Kent Kiehl & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2013).
Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations
of Law and Neuroscience (2013).
Law, Mind and Brain (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009).
Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating The Emerging Field of
Neurolaw, 38 Int’l J. Legal Info. 352 (2010).
Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: An
Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 171 (2007).
Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry: From the Clinic to the Courtroom (Joseph R. Simpson ed.,
2012).
New Perspectives on Human Activities (A.Battro, S. Dehaene & W. Singer eds.), Scripta Varia
121, Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Vatican City (2013).
Peter A. Alces, The Moral Intersection of Law & Neuroscience (forthcoming).
Law & The Brain (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
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